David Best

Results: 375



#Item
161Arts / Creativity / Onomatopoeia / Beep / Literature

TSA 2014 3EL1/3 Part 1B Narrator: Part 1B Jenny is talking to Uncle David about her best friend.

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Source URL: www.bca.hkeaa.edu.hk

Language: English - Date: 2014-10-03 02:35:12
162Science / Drew Fudenberg / Self-confirming equilibrium / David K. Levine / Fictitious play / Nash equilibrium / Solution concept / Trembling hand perfect equilibrium / Best response / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

An Economist’s Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning by Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine October 5, 2006 In their wide-ranging and provocative discussion, Shoham, Powers and Grenager (SPG) survey several large literatu

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2006-10-05 10:44:53
163Self-confirming equilibrium / Nash equilibrium / Bayesian game / Extensive-form game / Strategy / Solution concept / Strategic dominance / Best response / The Intuitive Criterion / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

Learning to Play Bayesian Games1 Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine2 First draft: December 23, 1996 Current revision: July 22, 2002 Abstract

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2003-11-04 12:28:39
164Nash equilibrium / Extensive-form game / Centipede game / Solution concept / Outcome / Strategy / Determinacy / Normal-form game / Best response / Game theory / Problem solving / Self-confirming equilibrium

MEASURING PLAYERS’ LOSSES IN EXPERIMENTAL GAMES* Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine October 7, 1996

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 1996-12-07 20:22:50
165Epistemology / Philosophical logic / Critical thinking / Abductive reasoning / Argument / Reason / Deductive reasoning / Inference / Possible world / Logic / Reasoning / Logical consequence

Faraci 1 BROWN ON MACKIE: ECHOES OF THE LOTTERY PARADOX David Faraci Phil Brown[removed]considers whether moral error theory is best understood as a necessary or

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Source URL: personal.bgsu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-09-23 22:11:53
166Nash equilibrium / Outcome / Best response / Normal-form game / Repeated game / Strategy / Bayesian game / Risk dominance / Game theory / Problem solving / Extensive-form game

When is Reputation Bad?1 Jeffrey Ely Drew Fudenberg David K. Levine2 First Version: April 22, 2002 This Version: November 20, 2005

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2005-11-21 14:01:27
167Science / Best response / Normal-form game / Nash equilibrium / Repeated game / Strategy / Reinforcement learning / Machine learning / Outcome / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

Ann Math Artif Intell DOI[removed]s10472[removed]A unifying learning framework for building artificial game-playing agents Wenlin Chen · Yixin Chen · David K. Levine

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2015-02-11 05:55:08
168Paradoxes / Moral skepticism / Morality / Abductive reasoning / Lottery paradox / Argument / Possible world / Modal logic / Logic / Epistemology / Skepticism

BROWN ON MACKIE: ECHOES OF THE LOTTERY PARADOX David Faraci Abstract In “The possibility of morality,” Phil Brown considers whether moral error theory is best understood as a necessary or contingent thesis. Among oth

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Source URL: personal.bgsu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2013-10-22 18:07:56
169Philosophy of mind / Rationality / Logic / Epistemology / Philosophy / Reason / Mind / Autonomy / Philosophical logic

FIRST-PERSONAL AUTHORITY AND THE NORMATIVITY OF RATIONALITY Christian Coons and David Faraci In “Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality,” Nicholas Southwood proposes that rational requirements are best understood

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Source URL: personal.bgsu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2013-10-22 18:24:30
170Nash equilibrium / Science / Strategy / Risk dominance / Best response / Continuous game / Evolutionary game theory / Game theory / Problem solving / Economics

Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population1 David K. Levine and Wolfgang Pesendorfer2 First version: September 29, 1999 This version: May 10, 2000

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Source URL: levine.sscnet.ucla.edu

Language: English - Date: 2000-05-10 11:49:25
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